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Abstract
This article comments on recent developments related to the establishment and empowerment of EU
agencies. These developments raise questions about which legal basis in the Treaties may be used for
such purposes and about the limits that the EU legislator should respect when empowering an agency.
In the absence of a clear provision in the Treaties, legal scholarship relied on the Meroni and Romano
rulings of the Court of Justice, which predate modern agencification, to clarify these issues. In Short-selling,
the Court has now scrutinised agency empowerment for the very first time, even if the Court’s ruling is
more of an excessive simplification exercise rather than a clarification exercise. The result of this ruling
is that there seem to be few genuine limits imposed on the EU legislator when it contemplates the
establishment and empowerment of an agency. The repercussions of this approach for the Single Resolution
Mechanism of the Banking Union, in which the establishment of an agency is also envisaged, are also
discussed.
Introduction
In recent times, it is hard to keep track of the process of agencification at EU level,1 the pace of which
seems to be continuously intensifying. The fourth wave of agencification saw the establishment of EU
agencies in sensitive core economic areas such as energy, finances, and telecoms.2 Following their
establishment, further EU legislation has granted powers to these bodies that had, so far, been reserved
*PhD researcher and Academic Assistant at the Ghent European Law Institute (JeanMonnet Centre of Excellence),
Ghent University. I would like to thank the anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Any errors remain solely
mine.
1The EU agencies meant here are what the EU institutions call “decentralised agencies”. They are permanent bodies
under EU public law, established by the institutions through secondary legislation, and endowed with their own legal
personality.
2M. Chamon, “EU Agencies between ‘Meroni’ and ‘Romano’ or the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea” (2011) 48
C.M.L. Rev. 1055, 1056.
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to the EU institutions proper.3 In other areas, the strengthening of existing agencies and the establishment
of new ones seems to be the European Union’s favourite response to policy problems or crises.4
From a legal perspective, two interesting issues have recently come under the spotlight again, showing
the problematic nature of the delegation to or conferral of power on these bodies. The first issue relates
to the use of art.114 TFEU as a legal basis to empower EU agencies. The second relates to the actual limits
to empowering these bodies. These issues have arisen in two recent but unconnected developments. The
first was the United Kingdom’s challenge before the Court of Justice in the Short-selling case of one of
the powers granted to the European Securities andMarkets Authority (ESMA); the second is the proposed
Board of Resolution (SRB) in the framework of the Single ResolutionMechanism (SRM) for the Banking
Union.5Although the debate on the limits to empowering agencies hasmainly been discussed by academics,6
these developments have really brought the underlying issues to the political institutions and even (for
the first time) to the Court of Justice.
In the Short-selling case, the Court delivered its judgment on January 22, 2014 following the Advocate
General’s Opinion of September 12, 2013; while the Council Legal Service (CLS) adopted legal opinions
in September and October 2013 on the SRM. Both examples will be discussed in turn, in order to identify
new developments in the debate on the empowerment of EU agencies.
Recapitulating the debate on the empowerment of EU agencies prior to the
Short-selling case
Following more than 40 years of agencification, a framework governing this process has still not been
established in primary law. Although the suggestion for such a framework had been made in successive
Intergovernmental Conferences,7 the Treaties do not provide that the EU legislator may establish and
empower EU agencies. And whereas the Commission had proposed an inter-institutional agreement
establishing a framework,8 this has only resulted in a non-binding Common Approach (CA).9 Because of
its meagre contents, the latter has been received rather sceptically by commentators.10 Indeed, for the most
3See, for instance, the European Securities and Markets Authority’s (ESMA’s) power to impose fines under
Regulation 648/2012, or its powers that were contested in Short-selling. See Regulation 648/2012 on OTC derivatives,
central counterparties and trade repositories [2012] OJ L201/1 and United Kingdom v Parliament and Council
(Short-selling) (C-270/12) January 22, 2014.
4See, for instance, the proposed establishment of the Single ResolutionMechanism ((SRM) COM(2013) 520 final)
or the Commission’s suggestion fundamentally to alter the European Railway Agency’s mandate in its proposals for
a fourth railway package. For the latter, see COM(2013) 27 final; COM(2013) 30 final and COM(2013) 31 final.
5See the Commission Proposal on the Single Resolution Mechanism, COM(2013) 520 final.
6Only a few of these contributions can be referred to here; see e.g. H. Hofmann and A. Morini, “Constitutional
Aspects of the Pluralisation of the EU Executive through ‘Agencification’” (2012) 37 E.L. Rev. 419; T. Zwart, “La
Poursuite du Père Meroni ou pourquoi Les Agences Pourraient Jouer un Rôle plus en Vue dans l’Union Européenne”
in D. de la Rochère (ed.), L’Exécution du Droit de l’Union, entre Mécanismes Communautaires et Droits Nationaux
(Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2009), pp.159–173; S. Griller and A. Orator, “Everything under Control? The ‘Way Forward’
for European Agencies in the Footsteps of the Meroni Doctrine” (2010) 35 E.L. Rev. 3.
7See E. Vos, “Agencies and the European Union” in T. Zwart and L. Verhey (eds), Agencies in European and
Comparative Perspective (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2003), pp.128–129.
8Commission, “Interinstitutional Agreement on the operating framework for the European regulatory agencies”
COM(2005) 59 final.
9See the Common Approach on Decentralised Agencies, adopted by the three institutions on July 19, 2012, http:/
/europa.eu/agencies/documents/joint_statement_and_common_approach_2012_en.pdf [Accessed April 23, 2014].
10See E. Bernard, “Accord sur les agences européennes: la montagne accouche d’une souris” (2012) 3 RDUE 440;
M. Scholten, “The Newly Released ‘CommonApproach’ on EUAgencies: Going Forward or Standing Still?” (2012),
CJEULOnline, http://www.cjel.net/online/19_2-scholten [AccessedApril 23, 2014]; F. Comte, “Agences décentralisées:
vers un statut unifié? Approche commune du Parlement européen, du Conseil de l’Union européenne et de la
Commission européenne sur les agences décentralisées” in I. Govaere and D. Hanf (eds), Scrutinizing Internal and
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part, the CA is a codification of established practice but does not even reflect all of that practice as it has
evolved up until the adoption of the CA.
EU agencies underMeroni and Romano
In the absence of a clear framework, both the EU institutions and academic commentators resorted to the
Court’s jurisprudence in theMeroni andRomano cases, which dealt with delegations,11 albeit not delegations
to EU agencies. As regards Meroni, there is a general consensus in legal scholarship that there exists a
Meroni doctrine. However, there is no consensus on which rules make up that doctrine, the only consistently
recurring element being that discretionary powers cannot be delegated. Other elements which have been
identified are that: (1) the delegating authority cannot delegate more powers than it itself possesses12; (2)
the delegating authority should ensure continued scrutiny13; (3) delegations cannot be implied but must
be established explicitly14; (4) continued judicial supervision should be ensured15; (5) the institutional
balance should not be upset16; and (6) the delegation should indeed be necessary in order to perform the
tasks concerned.17
An extra dimension to the institutions’ understanding of Meroni is, of course, the way in which this
ruling is used in the inter-institutional power struggle. The Commission, for its part, has often relied on
Meroni (and Romano) to safeguard its own position as primary actor in the EU executive.18 For instance,
when the Parliament proposed to empower the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER)
to impose fines on market operators independently from the Commission,19 the latter rejected this
amendment, citing Meroni.20 Four years later, however, the Commission could not prevent the legislator
from granting exactly the same power to ESMA.21 The Romano case is cited less frequently and is often
subsumed under the Meroni case even if the Court seemingly took an even more restrictive stance in
Romano, prohibiting the legislature to empower a body other than the Commission “to adopt acts having
the force of law”.22
External Dimensions of European Law: Les dimensions internes et externes du droit européen à l’épreuve (Bruxelles:
Peter Lang, 2013), Vol. I, pp.143–156.
11Meroni & Co, Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (9/56)
[1958] E.C.R. 11; Romano v Institut National d’Assurance Maladie-Invalidite (INAMI) (98/80) [1981] E.C.R. 1241;
[1983] 2 C.M.L.R. 698.
12See e.g. D. Geradin, “The Development of European Regulatory Agencies: What the EU should Learn from the
American Experience” (2004) 11 C.J.E.U.L. 9.
13See e.g. M. Blanquet, “Agences de l’union et gouvernance européenne” in J. Couzinet (ed.), Les Agences de
l’Union européenne (Toulouse: PUSST, 2002), p.64.
14See e.g. J.-V. Louis, “Le Fonds Européen de Cooperation Monetaire” (1973) 9 C.D.E. 290.
15See e.g. B. Remmert, “Die Gründung von Einrichtungen der mittelbaren Gemeinschaftsverwaltung” (2003) 37
Europarecht 139.
16See e.g. J.-P. Schneider, “A Common Framework for Decentralized EU Agencies and the Meroni Doctrine”
(2009) 61 Administrative Law Review Special Issue 35.
17See T. Tridimas, “Financial Supervision and Agency Power: Reflections on ESMA” in N. Nic Shuibhne and L.
Gormley (eds), From Single Market to Economic Union: Essays in Memory of John A. Usher (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012), p.60.
18See e.g. Commission, “Interinstitutional Agreement on the operating framework for the European regulatory
agencies” COM(2005) 59 final, p.5.
19See the Parliament’s Legislative Resolution [2009] OJ C286E/149 art.12.
20See Commission, “Commission Position on EP Amendments at First Reading”, SP(2008)4439 (June 18, 2006),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/spdoc.do?i=15160&j=0&l=en [Accessed April 23, 2014].
21See Regulation 648/2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories [2012] OJ L201/1
art.65.
22See Romano (98/80) [1981] E.C.R. 1241 at [20].
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It should be noted that whenMeroni is applied to the current EU agencies, it is often implicitly assumed
that the notion of delegation applies to the empowerment of these bodies. However, one could also argue
that the powers exercised by the EU agencies are not delegated by the legislator because these powers
have never been originally vested in it. The EU agencies’ powers would then be conferred on, instead of
delegated to, these bodies.
Whether changing the qualification from a delegation to a conferral leads to a different appraisal of the
empowerment of EU agencies is a different matter still. The CLS in the 1980s, for instance, rejected the
notion of delegation to describe the empowerment of the Office for the Harmonisation of the Internal
Market (OHIM), an agency, because “this specific case concerns the conferring of new powers, i.e. powers
which have not at the moment been vested in any Community institution … the decisions of the Court in
the Meroni Case do not seem to apply in this context”.23 It subsequently applied most of what it had
identified as theMeroni doctrine because it found that the doctrine enshrines a number of general principles
that apply in any case, regardless of whether one is faced with a delegation or a conferral. In a previous
contribution, Hofmann and Morini seemed to suggest that Meroni only applies if the empowerment of
agencies is qualified as a (sub)delegation, otherwise the “limits to the creation of agencies and their powers
arise from the constitutional principles such as conferral, proportionality and subsidiarity”.24 Of course,
the conclusion that Meroni only applies to (sub)delegations is greatly determined by those authors’
understanding of Meroni, which they reduce to the two requirements that an authority can only delegate
the powers it itself possesses and that delegated powers should be subject to strict review in the light of
objective criteria.25 By virtue of the first of these requirements, it would indeed be impossible to apply
Meroni fully to a conferral, since the powers of EU agencies are not originally vested in the legislator.
As a result, a number of important outstanding questions before the Court’s verdict in the Short-selling
case were:
• Can the EU legislature empower bodies such as EU agencies in the absence of a clear legal
basis?
• If so, are EU agencies empowered by delegations or by conferrals, and is there any practical
difference between the two?
• How do Meroni and Romano relate to each other, and do they apply to the empowerment
of EU agencies?
• If so, which rules doMeroni and Romano lay down, and how should they be applied to EU
agencies today?
• Depending on the rules making up the Meroni doctrine, and the relation between Meroni
and Romano, how does the institutional balance fit in? Does it underlie both rulings?
Article 114 TFEU as a legal basis
Turning to art.114 TFEU, the possibility of establishing agencies based on that provision has been discussed
less intensively in the legal doctrine. For a long time, the prevailing consensus was that agency creation
23Legal Service of the Council, Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community Trade Mark
(5837/85) June 6, 1985, p.6.
24Hofmann andMorini, “Constitutional Aspects of the Pluralisation of the EU Executive through ‘Agencification’”
(2012) 37 E.L. Rev. 419, 434. It should be noted that Hofmann and Morini do not themselves make the distinction
between delegation and conferral but speak of multiple delegationmechanisms, differentiating between “sub-delegation
of implementing powers” and “the creation of measures necessary to ensure that policies of the Union are properly
implemented”.
25Hofmann andMorini, “Constitutional Aspects of the Pluralisation of the EU Executive through ‘Agencification’”
(2012) 37 E.L. Rev. 419, 423.
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required recourse to art.352 TFEU as a legal basis,26 and the institutional practice up until 2001 also
confirmed this. Around that time, Vos concluded that establishing an agency as such was not possible
under art.114 TFEU, but adopting harmonisation measures, together with provisions establishing an
agency, was permissible under a centre of gravity test. Whether such a test would be passed would
ultimately depend on the answers to the questions whether the harmonisation measures “seek to eliminate
existing or future differences between national legislative provisions, and [whether] the agency [is]
dependent upon such harmonization measures”.27 The agency could not, therefore, be an end in itself but
should facilitate or be secondary to the harmonisation measures.
Yet, under this argument, the act establishing an agency is assessed in an isolated manner. What if the
EU legislature adopts a number of harmonisation measures in different instruments based on art.114 TFEU
and then complements this body of legislation with an act solely establishing an EU agency, where the
latter is a key measure to ensure the effectiveness of the other instruments? Could art.114 TFEU not be
used here?
Vos’s argument further focuses on the powers and tasks granted to an agency, not on the institutional
decision to establish an agency. This is clear in the remark that the agency,
“would no longer possess the supplementary character if proper decision-making powers were
delegated to it and these powers were exercised without Commission supervision. The delegation of
these powers to an agency would be of such institutional importance that it would not fall within the
concept of harmonisation.”28
However, the argument that only non-decision-making agencies could be established based on art.114
TFEU seems detached from the content of that provision, which revolves around the notion of “measures
for approximation”. In any event, from the third wave of agency creation onwards, the EU legislator did
indeed establish decision-making agencies such as the chemicals agency (ECHA), ACER, and the European
Supervisory Authorities on the sole legal basis of art.114 TFEU.
During the third wave, the use of art.114 TFEU as a legal basis for agency creation was also sanctioned
by the Court in the ENISA case.29 In that case, the Court had to deal with two issues raised by the United
Kingdom:whether the EUAgency for Network and Information Security’s (ENISA) tasks (when exercised)
could be qualified as “approximation measures”; and whether organisational arrangements, such as setting
up a body, are possible under art.114 TFEU. To put these questions into context, A.G. Kokott referred to
the conclusions of A.G. Stix-Hackl, followed by the Court, in the European Cooperative Society case,30
who found that the creation of a new form of co-operative society in addition to national forms could not
fall under the notion of the approximation of national legislation.31 According to A.G. Kokott, the
“approximation provisions” in the ENISA Regulation were to be found in the tasks granted to ENISA,
but these were overshadowed by the provisions on the establishment and organisation of ENISA, which
did “not contribute directly to the approximation of provisions of the Member States”.32
26See e.g. R. Lauwaars, “Auxiliary Organs and Agencies in the E.E.C.” (1979) 16 C.M.L. Rev. 376; M. Hilf, “Die
abhängige Juristische Person des Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts” (1976) 36 ZaöRV 559.
27E. Vos, “Reforming the European Commission: What Role to play for EU Agencies?” (2000) 37 C.M.L. Rev.
1122.
28E. Vos, Institutional Frameworks of Community Health and Safety Legislation: Committees, Agencies and Private
Bodies (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999), p.199.
29However, ENISA is an atypical agency in that it is only established for a limited period, even if the institutions
keep amending its founding regulation, extending that period every time.
30European Parliament v Council of the European Union (European Cooperative Society) (C-436/03) [2006]
E.C.R. I-3733; [2006] 3 C.M.L.R. 3 at [44].
31Opinion of A.G. Stix-Hackl in European Cooperative Society (C-436/03) [2006] E.C.R. I-3733 at [96]–[98].
32Opinion of A.G. Kokott in United Kingdom v Parliament and Council (C-217/04) [2006] E.C.R. I-3771; [2006]
3 C.M.L.R. 2 at [26].
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TheAdvocate General might have concluded here that a Regulation containing primarily organisational
provisions could not be established on the basis of art.114 TFEU, but then she observed:
“[However,] the establishment of ENISA cannot be separated from its tasks, but is a means to the
end. The ENISA Regulation thus pursues only a single aim, which is to be derived above all from
the provisions on the tasks of ENISA.”33
By describing the organisational arrangements as a means to the end pursued by the material rules, A.G.
Kokott seemingly found those arrangements to be implied by art.114 TFEU, without entering into the
question of whether the agency-instrument was indeed necessary, or indispensable, for these material
rules.34 Still, because the Advocate General found that ENISA’s tasks did not qualify as measures for
approximation, she did not address the fundamental question of agency creation based on art.114 TFEU:
“Finally, it may be left open whether the establishment of an agency with legal personality on the
basis of Article [114 TFEU]—or pursuant to other specific legal bases of the [TFEU] without recourse
to Article [352 TFEU]—is precluded by obstacles of principle. Although the Court put questions to
that effect at the hearing, the parties have not discussed this point in detail in the present case.”35
The Court did not really engage with that question either, since it merely remarked that:
“The legislature may deem it necessary to provide for the establishment of a Community body
responsible for contributing to the implementation of a process of harmonisation.”36
The Court therefore spoke in very general terms of “Community bodies”, without making a distinction
between permanent or temporary bodies and bodies with or without legal personality. Having dealt with
the issue of establishment, it did not make a clear distinction between the material and organisational rules
in the Regulation, unlike the Advocate General, but seemingly took the establishment and the tasks of the
agency as a single measure. It thus remarked that:
“The legislature may deem it necessary to provide for the establishment of a Community body
responsible for contributing to the implementation of a process of harmonisation in situations where
… the adoption of non-binding supporting and framework measures seems appropriate.”37
After having concluded that ENISA’s tasks could be situated within the broader regulatory framework of
network security, it hinted at making a distinction by stating that,
“it needs to be determined … whether the establishment of the Agency and the objectives and tasks
which are assigned to it by the regulation may be regarded as ‘measures for approximation’ within
the meaning of Article [114 TFEU].”38
However, the Court then continued by taking the establishment of ENISA as a proxy for its tasks, since
it observed that the,
33Opinion of A.G. Kokott in United Kingdom v Parliament (C-217/04) [2006] E.C.R. I-3771 at [27].
34According to Vetter, it should be shown that the establishment of an agency, based on art.114 TFEU and the
implied powers doctrine, is compellingly necessary (zwingend erforderlich). See R. Vetter, “Die Kompetenzen der
Gemeinschaft zur Gründung von unabhängigen europäischen Agenturen” (2005) 58 DÖV 721, 729.
35Opinion of A.G. Kokott in ENISA (C-217/04) [2006] E.C.R. I-3771 at [46].
36ENISA (C-217/04) [2006] E.C.R. I-3771 at [44].
37ENISA (C-217/04) at [44].
38ENISA (C-217/04) at [59] (emphasis added).
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“legislature considered that the establishment of a Community body such as the Agency was an
appropriate means of preventing the emergence of disparities likely to create obstacles to the smooth
functioning of the internal market in the area.”39
At face value, this observation seems questionable, since the establishment of a new EU body cannot itself
be a means to prevent disparities from emerging; and it stands in contrast with the Opinion of the Advocate
General who, rightly, believed that the establishment and organisation of ENISA is simply an instrument
to allow ENISA’s tasks to be carried out. Because it remained uncertain whether ENISA would actually
contribute to or facilitate harmonisation (the Advocate General thought it would not), the Court concluded
by emphasising that ENISAwas established only for five years and that the Commission would be obliged
to assess ENISA’s contribution to the implementation of the relevant directives. According to Bouveresse,
this element was decisive in order for the Court to come to its conclusion.40
As regards art.114 TFEU, the following questions may thus be raised:
• May the EU legislature establish (permanent) agencies without recourse to art.352 TFEU?
• If Treaty provisions speak of “measures” to be taken, does this cover both material rules
and “organisational measures”?
• May art.114 TFEU be used to establish an EU agency? Is the organisational act setting up
an agency a harmonisation measure in itself or is this subsumed under the material rules
(which do harmonise) contained in that act?
• Should the act establishing an EU agency be assessed on its own merits for the purposes of
art.114 TFEU, or may an assessment depend on the legislative context in which that act
should be situated?
In what follows, the issues identified in this section will be commented upon in relation to the two topical
examples of the Short-selling case and the SRM proposal.
United Kingdom v Council and Parliament—the Short-selling case
In Short-selling, the United Kingdom challenged ESMA’s powers to prohibit (or impose conditions on)
short-selling under art.28 of Regulation 236/2012.41 The United Kingdom invoked both the Meroni and
Romano jurisprudence. In addition, it argued that since the measures adopted by ESMA would be
non-legislative acts of general application, they would be contrary to arts 290 and 291 TFEU, which
reserve the power to adopt delegated or implementing acts to the Commission. Lastly, if ESMA were to
use its power to adopt individual decisions, the United Kingdom claimed that the Regulation could not
be based on art.114 TFEU.42
It goes without saying that the issues raised in relation to ESMA are also highly relevant for other EU
agencies since the silence in primary law on the limits to agencification has placed a special responsibility
on the Court. As Hofmann and Morini predicted:
39ENISA (C-217/04) [2006] E.C.R. I-3771 at [62].
40A. Bouveresse, “Bases juridiques autorisant la création d’organismes dotés d’une personnalité juridique propre”
(2006) 203 Europe 10.
41Regulation 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on short selling and certain aspects of credit
default swaps [2012] OJ L86/1.
42Short-selling (C-270/12) January 22, 2014 at [89].
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“The European Courts will have to face and explicitly begin to address the questions of the nature
of delegation and the position of EU agencies in implementing EU policies in the absence of a clear
constitutional mandate.”43
Here, the Court had different options at its disposal. If it had followed the letter of its previous jurisprudence,
it could only have concluded that the empowerment of ESMA by Regulation 236/2012 is illegal.44 The
alternative for the Court was to rule that Meroni and Romano do not apply any longer in the post-Lisbon
EU legal order, or to reinterpret these rulings so that ESMA’s powers might be upheld.45 The Court could,
for instance, have done so by ruling that Romano prohibits the delegation of formal legislative powers
and that Meroni prohibits the delegation of the power to decide on the essential elements of (material)
legislation.46Because A.G. Jääskinen47 proposed to solve the case solely on the fourth plea, the latter option
will be looked at first.
Article 114 TFEU as a legal basis
In his Opinion on the case, A.G. Jääskinen proposed that the Court could ignore the first three pleas by
solving the case on the argument related to art.114 TFEU, albeit not for the reason advanced by the United
Kingdom. The United Kingdom had raised its fourth plea only in the event that ESMA could use its power
under art.28 of Regulation 236/2012 to address individual decisions to market operators.48 A.G. Jääskinen
analysed the power under art.28 in the light of the ENISA case. The Advocate General noted that,
“it is difficult to envisage how the exercise of a power under Article 28 of Regulation 236/2012 could
contribute to harmonisation of the kind described by the Court in ENISA. Rather its function is to lift
implementation powers… from the national level to the EU level when there is disagreement between
ESMA and the competent national authority or between national authorities.”49
As a result, A.G. Jääskinen concluded that art.114 TFEU only allows for harmonisation of national
(decision-making) procedures and not the replacement of such national procedures with decision-making
at EU level.50 He then proposed art.352 TFEU as the proper legal basis to confer the contested power on
ESMA.51
The Advocate General’s solution would indeed have helped to avoid the even more contentious issues
that the other pleas of the United Kingdom raised, but his approach was also rather restrictive. After all,
as noted, the Court had found the agency in ENISA to be the organisational form incidental to the ENISA
43Hofmann andMorini, “Constitutional Aspects of the Pluralisation of the EU Executive through ‘Agencification’”
(2012) 37 E.L. Rev. 419, 443. In Short-selling, however, the Court did not address these two questions.
44See also A. Orator, “Die unionsrechtliche Zulässigkeit von Eingriffsbefugnissen der ESMA im Bereich von
Leerverkäufen” (2013) 24 EuZW 852, 855.
45For a more elaborate discussion of these options, seeM. Chamon, “Le recours à la soft law commemoyen d’éluder
les obstacles constitutionnels au développement des agences de l’UE” (2014) 576 RUE 152, 157–158.
46This would then result in aligning the Court’sKöster (see Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel
v Köster and Berodt & Co (25/70) [1970] E.C.R. 1161) jurisprudence with itsMeroni jurisprudence.
47For a discussion of the Advocate General’s Opinion, see Orator, “Die unionsrechtliche Zulässigkeit von
Eingriffsbefugnissen der ESMA im Bereich von Leerverkäufen” (2013) 24 EuZW 852.
48Short-selling (C-270/12) January 22, 2014 at [88]–[89].
49Short-selling (C-270/12) at [50].
50Short-selling (C-270/12) at [52].
51Orator, “Die unionsrechtliche Zulässigkeit von Eingriffsbefugnissen der ESMA im Bereich von Leerverkäufen”
(2013) 24 EuZW 852, rejects A.G. Jääskinen’s claim at [58] of the Opinion that art.352 TFEU would enhance
democratic input. Even if only for the reduced role of the European Parliament, on which Orator does not rely, the
Advocate General’s claim would indeed appear doubtful.
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Regulation’s material rules,52 stressing the importance of the relation between ENISA’s tasks and the
existing body of EU legislation in the field of network security.53 In Smoke Flavourings, the Court had
validated a centralised procedure at EU level for the authorisation of certain (food) products. The Court
found that this authorisation could amount to a harmonisation measure under art.114 TFEU if its essential
elements were contained in the basic legislative act and if the procedure to reach a centralised decision is
designed in such a way that it results in harmonisation.54
As noted above, in the European Cooperative Society case, on the other hand, the Court rejected the
use of art.114 TFEU to establish a new legal form for a co-operative society that would exist alongside
the existing national legal forms. As it left the latter unchanged, the Court found that there was no
“approximation”.55
In General Product Safety, the Court sanctioned the adoption of individual measures based on art.114
TFEU, noting that,
“the concept of ‘measures for the approximation’ of legislation must be interpreted as encompassing
the Council’ s power to lay down measures relating to a specific product or class of products and, if
necessary, individual measures concerning those products.”56
Furthermore, the Commission and Council in General Product Safety emphasised that the individual
measures at issue were addressed to the Member States and did not have direct effect with respect to
individuals.57 The competence to issue such individual measures was triggered by the existence or risk of
divergent national measures, following which the Commission could require the Member States to take
certain temporary measures to address such obstacles to the internal market.
In the light of these cases, art.114 TFEU might therefore allow for a centralised procedure such as that
provided for in art.28 of Regulation 236/2012, covering both the adoption of general and individual
measures as “harmonisation measures” that do not co-exist alongside national measures. The questions
remainingwould then be whether the essential elements of the harmonisationmeasure are already contained
in the basic act, as prescribed by Smoke Flavourings, and whether the individual measures may also be
addressed to private parties, in contrast to what had been at issue in General Product Safety. Probably
because it had already ruled in relation to the first plea that ESMA had not been accorded discretionary
powers (as discussed further below), the Court did not dwell on the first of these questions. As to the
second question, the Court referred to General Product Safety and to ENISA, in which it had noted that
nothing in the wording of art.114 TFEU “implies that the addressees of the measures adopted by the
Community legislature on the basis of that provision can only be the individual Member States”.58
The Court then dismissed the United Kingdom’s plea by testing the contested power in light of the
express Treaty provision, noting that,
“a legislative act adopted on that legal basis must, first, comprise measures for the approximation of
the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in theMember States and, second,
have as its object the establishment and functioning of the internal market.”59
52ENISA (C-217/04) [2006] E.C.R. I-3771 at [62].
53ENISA (C-217/04) at [47].
54United Kingdom v European Parliament (Smoke Flavourings) (C-66/04) [2005] E.C.R. I-10553; [2006] 3 C.M.L.R.
1 at [47]–[48].
55European Cooperative Society (C-436/03) [2006] E.C.R. I-3733 at [44].
56Germany v Council (General Product Safety) (C-359/92) [1994] E.C.R. I-3681; [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 413 at [37].
57See General Product Safety (C-359/92) [1994] E.C.R. I-3681 at [16].
58ENISA (C-217/04) at [44].
59Short-selling (C-270/12) January 22, 2014 at [100].
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On the first of these requirements, the Court stressed the large margin of discretion left to the legislator
to choose the most appropriate method of approximation and found that the legislator “may delegate to a
Union body, office or agency powers for the implementation of the harmonisation sought”.60 With this
first issue out of the way, the result of the test was already determined since there was no doubt that the
measure in casu had as its object the proper functioning of the internal market, given the plethora of
incongruent national measures which had been adopted in this field during the financial crisis.
How has the Short-selling case clarified the questions on art.114 TFEU raised above? Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the general question of agency creation and empowerment without recourse to art.352
TFEU has still not been addressed. After all, unlike in the ENISA case where the United Kingdom had
argued that the contested regulation could only have been adopted based on art.352 TFEU, such an
argument had not been advanced by the United Kingdom in Short-selling. Whereas commentators had
deplored the fact that the Court did not address this issue in ENISA,61 one cannot reproach the Court for
not venturing ultra petita in the present case.
A similar observation may be made on the second question, but on the third question the Court did
further develop its reasoning in ENISA.62While the Court was not asked to rule on the decision to establish
the agency as such, it recalled the legislator’s discretion on the most appropriate form of approximation
(as noted above) and referred to its judgment in ENISA where it found that this also allows the legislator
to establish EU bodies, if necessary in a process of harmonisation. This was then also taken as the standard
to determine whether powers of implementation could be delegated to an EU body. The Court’s ruling
confirms that the legislator has a very large margin of discretion to take any measures necessary for
harmonisation, regardless of their nature, be they organisational or material.63 The present ruling of the
Court could thus be criticised on the same grounds as its ruling in the ENISA case.64 This criticism could
be addressed by insisting that the legislator first show that a certain implementation power is necessary
for contributing to the process of harmonisation and then demonstrate why an organisational form such
an EU agency is necessary to exercise that power.65 In any event, the Court’s ruling in Short-selling has
also sanctioned the delegation of powers to other agencies that have been empowered pursuant to art.114
TFEU, such as the ACER and ECHA.
60Short-selling (C-270/12) January 22, 2014 at [105].
61See e.g. K. Gutman, “Case C-66/04, Smoke Flavorings: Case C-436/03, SCE; & Case C-217/04, ENISA” (2006)
13 Colum. J. Eur. L. 147, 176–177; V. Randazzo, “Case C-217/04, United Kingdom v. European Parliament and
Council of the European Union” (2007) 44 C.M.L. Rev. 155, 168–169.
62Regarding the fourth question, it should be noted that this case did not concern the decision to establish ESMA
but only to (further) empower it. In any event, in dismissing the United Kingdom’s fourth plea, the Court only relied
on considerations related to Regulation 236/2012 itself without needing to refer to the broader regulatory framework.
63 In e.g. the French, German, and Dutch language versions of the Court’s ruling, this is clearer. In the English
version, the Court found that the legislator could establish an agency if it found it necessary for the purposes of
harmonisation and accordingly could delegate powers to that agency. In the three other versions, the Court does not
link these two considerations, using “conformément”, “dementsprechend” or “dienovereenkomstig” instead of using
“partant”, “demzufolge” and “bijgevolg”, implying causality more clearly than (simple) accordance.
64See e.g. C. Ohler, “Rechtmäßige Errichtung der Gemeinschaftsagentur ENISA” (2006) 17 EuZW 369, 373–374;
Vetter, “Die Kompetenzen der Gemeinschaft zur Gründung von unabhängigen europäischen Agenturen” (2005) 58
DÖV 721, 729.
65The outcome in this case probably would not be different, since the Court referred to both the fragmentation of
the internal market if national authorities would adopt incongruent measures and to the specific professional and
technical expertise of ESMA. The approach suggested could, however, alleviate concerns that the Court defers all
too eagerly to the legislator.
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ESMA’s power underMeroni, Romano, and arts 290 and 291 TFEU
Again, because of the different approach taken by the Advocate General and the Court, the Opinion will
first be discussed, followed by a discussion of the Court’s ruling.
A.G. Jääskinen’s analysis
In the event that the Court would not follow his suggestion to decide the case solely on the art.114 TFEU
point, the Advocate General worked out an analysis on the pleas related to Meroni and Romano, noting
that,
“the evolution in the EU constitutional law that occurred under the Lisbon Treaty has indeed
accommodated the pivotal concerns with which the Court had to deal inMeroni and Romano; namely
the absence of treaty based criteria for the conferral and delegation of powers so as to ensure respect
for institutional balance, and the vacuum in terms of judicial review of legally binding acts of
agencies.”66
The Treaty of Lisbon has indeed elaborated the EuropeanUnion’s system of judicial review, accommodating
the EU agencies, but there is still no explicit Delegationsnorm allowing for delegations to agencies.67 The
Advocate General therefore presented an interesting analysis, differentiating delegated acts under art.290
TFEU from implementing acts under art.291 TFEU. According to the Advocate General, agencies cannot
be empowered to adopt delegated acts because the latter may alter the normative content of legislative
acts. This requires a democratic accountability that only the Commission, as the body accountable before
the European Parliament, actually has.68 As regards implementing acts, however, the Advocate General
noted that these do not amend or supplement legislative acts and therefore the same restriction would not
apply.69 A.G. Jääskinen correctly observed that the fact that the distinction between implementing and
delegated acts is not always clear70 cannot be a reason for rejecting such fundamental consequences of the
distinction.71
The problem remains, however, that just like art.290 TFEU, art.291 TFEU does not make any reference
to agencies; and even the Comitology Regulation adopted under the latter provision does not mention
agencies one single time.72 The Advocate General’s willingness to grant implementing powers to EU
agencies thus rested on two elements. First, such powers do not require a great level of democratic
legitimacy. Secondly, the Advocate General referred to the system of judicial protection, notably arts 263
and 277 TFEU, to which the EU agencies have now also been subjected, which would be pointless if they
could not adopt binding acts.73
66Opinion of A.G. Jääskinen in Short-selling (C-270/12) September 12, 2013 at [72].
67 In the work of Barbey, the Delegationsnorm is the rule that sets out the conditions under which a lower rule (the
delegierende Norm) may deviate from the Regelnorm (which the Delegationsnorm should at least match in rank).
See G. Barbey, Rechtsübertragung und Delegation: eine Auseinandersetzung mit der Delegationslehre Heinrich
TRIEPELs (Münster: Max Kramer, 1962), pp.76–77.
68See Opinion of A.G. Jääskinen in Short-selling (C-270/12) at [85].
69Opinion of A.G. Jääskinen in Short-selling (C-270/12) at [86].
70On this point, seeCommission v European Parliament and Council (C-427/12)March 18, 2014 where the question
regarding the dividing line between implementing acts under art.291 TFEU and delegated acts under art.290 TFEU
was put to the Court for the first time.
71See Opinion of A.G. Jääskinen in Short-selling (C-270/12) at [78] n.103.
72Regulation 182/2011 [2011] OJ L55/13.
73Orator has questioned this deduction; see Orator, “Die unionsrechtliche Zulässigkeit von Eingriffsbefugnissen
der ESMA im Bereich von Leerverkäufen” (2013) 24 EuZW 852, 855.
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While the second argument may seem sensible, accepting the existence of an implicitDelegationsnorm,
inferred from the system of judicial protection, is still quite a fundamental step to take.74 As regards the
first argument, while it is evident that a sufficient degree of democratic legitimacy is in order when (formal
or material) legislation is adopted, democratic concerns are not absent from implementing acts either.
Article 11 of the Comitology Regulation, for instance, provides for a right of scrutiny for the European
Parliament, precisely because the (democratic) legislature has an evident interest in scrutinising the way
in which its legislation is implemented. However, such a right of scrutiny is not in place when EU agencies
take decisions. It is not entirely clear, therefore, why the lack of democratic legitimacy of EU agencies
would only be problematic for delegated acts but not for implementing acts.
In addition, the distinction on democratic grounds between the two types of acts is not of a fundamental
nature. After all, one could take the Parliament’s democratic scrutiny powers vis-à-vis the Commission
and mirror them in the acts laying down the statutes of EU agencies. EU agencies would then find
themselves in the same position as the Commission, except for the fact that the Parliament’s scrutiny
powers over the agencies would only be laid down in secondary law. Even then, if the Delegationsnorm
may be implicitly presumed under the Treaties, the scrutiny powers of the Parliament may surely be
presumed to be all-encompassing and derived from primary law as well, bar explicit leges specialis. As
a result, if the right mechanisms were instituted to allow the Parliament to exercise the same, or even
greater, control over EU agencies as it exercises over the Commission, there would be no reason any
longer to deny EU agencies the power to adopt delegated acts, under the reasoning of the Advocate General.
The distinction based on a pure democracy argument further ignores the separation of powers or
institutional balance dimension of the problem, even if the Advocate General also stressed the importance
of the institutional balance in this case.75 Ultimately this goes to the question of how the executive power
in the European Union is conceived. In the EU legal order, there is clearly a multilevel executive, authorities
at both Member State and EU level being competent.76 Focusing on the European Union, the questions
that arise are whether the Commission is the primary EU executive actor and whether, ultimately, the
notion of a unitary (EU) executive should be established at EU level. It is therefore the definition of the
Commission’s role that should largely solve how EU agencies could fit in the EU executive. This issue
is exemplified in the Advocate General’s concluding remarks, in which he noted that:
“Meroni remains relevant in that (i) powers cannot be delegated to an agency that are different from
the implementing powers the EU legislature has conferred on the delegating authority, be it the
Commission or the Council … The delegating authority ‘must take an express decision transferring
them and the delegation can relate only to clearly defined executive powers’.”77
Although the Advocate General later came back to this point (discussed further below), it suggests that
the Commission is the authority delegating powers to the agencies. In reality, however, it is the legislature
that grants powers to the EU agencies, powers which the Treaties say should be granted to the Commission.
Since Meroni was determined under the ECSC Treaty, its logic assumes that the Commission is the
European Union’s unitary executive (as the High Authority was in the ECSC). If that is the case, the
Commission’s role should be greatly enhanced when it comes to delegating powers to the EU agencies,
a point picked up again below.
A.G. Jääskinen thus concluded that delegating implementing powers under art.291 TFEU is permissible
within the confines of theMeroni doctrine. He then observed that ESMA’s powers were conferred rather
74In this sense, see also C. Ohler, “Rechtsetzungsbefugnisse der EuropäischenWertpapier- undMarktaufsichtsbehörde
(ESMA)” (2014) 69 JZ 244, 250.
75See Opinion of A.G. Jääskinen in Short-selling (C-270/12) at [72].
76P. Craig, EU Administrative Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp.27–33.
77See Opinion of A.G. Jääskinen in Short-selling (C-270/12) at [88].
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than delegated by the legislature, since the legislature does not possess implementing powers itself.
However, similarly to the CLS’s opinion on OHIM noted above, the Advocate General also noted that
this did not mean thatMeroni does not apply.78 He continued by reinterpretingMeroni so that the doctrine
reserves policy choices, which should be sufficiently spelled out, to the legislature. Because the Advocate
General precluded agencies from adopting delegated acts, he did not go as far as aligning Meroni with
Köster.79After all, delegated acts may still contain policy choices but cannot touch on the essential elements
of legislation, which is the demarcation line originally set in Köster.
The Advocate General further found that the complex factual assessments that ESMA would have to
make do not mean that it is in breach of Meroni.80 That agencies may make such assessments has indeed
already been accepted by the Courts.81 In addition, the Advocate General noted that the discretion of ESMA
is further restricted by the delegated acts that the Commission adopts, concluding that the conferral of
powers to ESMA by art.28 of Regulation 236/2012 was permissible under Meroni.82
The Court’s ruling
Where the Advocate General’s Opinion read as a delicate attempt to reconcile the requirements of rigorous
analytical reasoning with the concern of allowing the European Union to fulfil its objectives, which today
requires the involvement of EU agencies, the Court’s ruling appears much more like a simplification
exercise.
Romano does not add anything toMeroni
Just like the Advocate General, the Court found Meroni and Romano to be applicable to EU agencies.
Yet, where the Advocate General noted that the Lisbon Treaty had addressed the issues underlying both
Meroni and Romano, he dealt with these two rulings separately. The Court, however, entirely subsumed
Romano under Meroni by noting that “it cannot be inferred from Romano that the delegation of powers
to a body such as ESMA is governed by conditions other than those set out inMeroni v High Authority”.83
The Court’s decision on this issue is a first major simplification, although debatable in itself (a point
developed further below).
ReducingMeroni to a single criterion
The Court’s second major simplificationmay be found in its recapitulation ofMeroni. Above, it was noted
that many different elements could be identified as constituting the Meroni doctrine. The Court noted,
however, that inMeroni it,
“stated, in essence, that the consequences resulting from a delegation of powers are very different
depending onwhether it involves clearly defined executive powers the exercise of which can, therefore,
be subject to strict review in the light of objective criteria determined by the delegating authority, or
whether it involves a ‘discretionary power implying a wide margin of discretion whichmay, according
to the use which is made of it, make possible the execution of actual economic policy’.”84
78Opinion of A.G. Jääskinen in Short-selling (C-270/12) at [91]. On this point, see also Orator, “Die unionsrechtliche
Zulässigkeit von Eingriffsbefugnissen der ESMA im Bereich von Leerverkäufen” (2013) 24 EuZW 852, 854.
79See fn.46.
80Opinion of A.G. Jääskinen in Short-selling (C-270/12) at [94].
81See fnn.101 and 102.
82Opinion of A.G. Jääskinen in Short-selling (C-270/12) at [101].
83Short-selling (C-270/12) January 22, 2014 at [66].
84Short-selling (C-270/12) January 22, 2014 at [41] (emphasis added).
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Although the Court, in its previous jurisprudence, had recalled a more complete Meroni doctrine,85 and
even if the Advocate General had presented aMeroni doctrine that was more faithful to the original,86 the
Court reducedMeroni to its supposed essence, i.e. the single prohibition of delegating discretionary powers.
Here the Court also took a first step in introducing a Meroni-light doctrine, by dismissing other possible
elements. A second step was then taken by reinterpreting the single requirement still retained by the Court.
Before doing so, the Court, in a preliminary observation, remarked that the power in casu did not go
“beyond the bounds of the regulatory framework established by the ESMA Regulation”,87 notably its
art.9(5). That paragraph provides inter alia that ESMA,
“may temporarily prohibit or restrict certain financial activities that threaten the orderly functioning
and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the
Union in the cases specified and under the conditions laid down in the legislative acts referred to in
Article 1(2).”
The latter paragraph in turn referred to the relevant legislation in force at the time of the adoption of the
ESMARegulation and any future relevant legislation (such as Regulation 236/2012). Still, it is not entirely
clear what drove the Court in making this observation. Surely it could not have meant that any potential
irregularity in Regulation 236/2012 could be covered by a previous piece of secondary legislation. And
if an assessment of the context within which a power is exercised is essential properly to qualify that
power, as the Court further suggested, the United Kingdom could surely not have been required to request
the annulment of art.9(5) of the ESMA Regulation in the absence of any further measures concretising
that provision.
As already noted, in order to ascertain whether the power in casuwas not discretionary, the Court rightly
emphasised the context in which ESMA would exercise that power. To this end, it recalled four elements
in the regulatory framework that circumscribed the margin left to ESMA. First, ESMA can only exercise
this power in case of a systemic risk and when no national authority has acted adequately. Interestingly,
however, the Court did not seem to take issue with the fact that, under the logic of art.28, it is up to ESMA
itself to decide whether these conditions are met. Secondly, when these conditions are met, ESMA has to
take into account the criteria of para.3 of art.28. These are threefold: ESMA’s action (i) should address
the threat concerned or improve the national authorities’ ability to handle the threat; (ii) should not create
a risk of regulatory arbitrage; and (iii) should not have a negative impact on the financial market’s efficiency
in a manner which is disproportionate to its beneficial impact. Thirdly, before taking any action, ESMA
is required to consult the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). Lastly, the Court referred to the power
of the Commission to elaborate this framework further by adopting delegated acts, which the Commission
had done through Delegated Regulation 918/2012.88 The Court then concluded that ESMA’s powers “are
precisely delineated and amenable to judicial review in the light of the objectives established by the
delegating authority.”89
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU do not form an exhaustive system
A third major element in the Court’s ruling was a rather simple solution to the United Kingdom’s third
plea but by no means a real simplification. The Court found that,
85Tralli v European Central Bank (C-301/02 P) [2005] E.C.R. I-4071 at [43].
86See Opinion of A.G. Jääskinen in Short-selling (C-270/12) at [62].
87Short-selling (C-270/12) at [44].
88Commission Delegated Regulation 918/2012 [2012] OJ L274/1.
89Short-selling (C-270/12) at [53].
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“for the purpose of addressing the third plea in law, the Court is called upon to adjudicate on whether
the authors of the FEU Treaty intended to establish, in Articles 290 TFEU and 291 TFEU, a single
legal framework under which certain delegated and executive powers may be attributed solely to the
Commission or whether other systems for the delegation of such powers to Union bodies, offices or
agencies may be contemplated by the Union legislature.”90
The Court then confirmed the second possibility by first noting that primary law, since the entry into force
of the Lisbon Treaty, explicitly provides for legal remedies against agencies’ acts. In addition, it found
that the power foreseen in the contested art.28 does not correspond to any of the situations defined in arts
290 and 291 TFEU. As a result, the EU legislator, by inscribing art.28 in Regulation 236/2012, did not
undermine the system as set up under arts 290 and 291 TFEU.
Assessing the Court’s ruling
At this point, it is interesting to verify the extent to which the Court’s ruling has answered the questions
raised in the first part. The Court answered the question of whether the EU legislature may empower EU
agencies in the absence of a clear legal basis affirmatively. In this regard, the Court referred twice to the
possibility of challenging agencies’ general acts under arts 263 and 277 TFEU.91 As was also noted by
Griller and Orator in a previous issue of the Review,92 that possibility, introduced by the Lisbon Treaty,
would then be meaningless if the agencies could not be empowered in the first place.93 The Court further
made it perfectly clear thatMeroni and Romano apply to EU agencies, and it addressed how these rulings
interrelate, by subsuming Romano under Meroni and by reducing the latter to the single requirement of
prohibiting the delegation of discretionary powers.
AMeroni-light
As to how this new Meroni doctrine should be applied to EU agencies, there is less clarity. The Court
stressed the context in which a power is exercised in order to determine its (non-)discretionary nature, but
it is difficult to induce some abstract rule from this approach. Unless the Court were to clarify further or
elaborate on this point,94 determining the nature of a delegated power would depend on a case-by-case
analysis. That the Court opted forMeroni-light is clear, on the other hand. In the beginning of its analysis,
the Court subtly tried to distinguish the situation in Meroni from that in casu:
“Unlike the case of the powers delegated to the bodies concerned in Meroni v High Authority, the
exercise of the powers under Article 28 of Regulation No 236/2012 is circumscribed by various
conditions and criteria which limit ESMA’s discretion.”95
Whether the Court was right in making this preliminary observation is, however, debatable. After all,
Decision 22/54, through which the High Authority had delegated its powers and which was at issue in
Meroni, provided that the delegated powers would be exercised under the responsibility of the High
90Short-selling (C-270/12) at [78].
91Short-selling (C-270/12) at [65] and [80]. See also Orator’s critique on this: Orator, “Die unionsrechtliche
Zulässigkeit von Eingriffsbefugnissen der ESMA im Bereich von Leerverkäufen” (2013) 24 EuZW 852, 855.
92See Griller and Orator, “Everything under Control?” (2010) 35 E.L. Rev. 3, 27.
93This was also remarked by the Advocate General; see his Opinion in Short-selling (C-270/12) at [74].
94The pending cases C-507/13, and C-146 and 147/13 may provide an opportunity for this. The latter two cases
concern a challenge by Spain of an empowerment of the European Patent Office in the framework of the European
Unitary Patent. The former concerns a challenge by the United Kingdom of a power granted to the European Banking
Authority in the framework of the bankers’ bonus cap.
95Short-selling (C-270/12) at [45].
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Authority.96 To this end, a representative of the High Authority attended all of the meetings of the boards
of the two Offices to which powers had been delegated. That representative could reserve every decision
of those boards to the High Authority. In addition, the Council and the High Authority had also laid down
a number of criteria that the Offices needed to take into account. InMeroni, however, the Court had found
that these criteria still left too much leeway to the Offices as their decisions “cannot be the result of mere
accountancy procedures based on objective criteria laid down by the High Authority”.97 However, the
criteria laid down by the legislator in para.3 of the contested art.28 are, for obvious reasons, similarly
vague. In addition, the criteria laid down by the Commission in its delegated regulation referred to above
are also, necessarily, generally worded. For instance, they provide that a systemic threat under the contested
art.28 should be understood as,
“any threat of serious financial, monetary or budgetary instability concerning a Member State or the
financial system within a Member State when this may seriously threaten the orderly functioning
and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the
Union.”
Furthermore, it should be noted that the Commission’s delegated acts are themselves drafted by ESMA,98
and that the Commission is not free to deviate from ESMA’s drafts.99 The Court did not take issue with
this, but the extent to which the Commission really “restricts” ESMA here may be questioned. Whether
ESMA’s future decisions, based on art.28 of Regulation 236/2012, would then be the result of a “mere
accountancy procedure” based on this “objective criterion” laid down by the Commission (and drafted
by ESMA itself) or of the criteria laid down in Regulation 236/2012 is questionable. Instead, both in the
present case and in Meroni, certain general criteria had been laid down but it appears that the Court was
less strict in its approach in the Short-selling case than it was in Meroni.100
Extent of judicial review
This new Meroni-light also appears problematic in the light of the General Court’s jurisprudence on
agencies. In Schräder, which dealt with a decision of the Community Plant Variety Office, the Court noted
that “where a Community authority is called upon, in the performance of its duties, to make complex
assessments, it enjoys a wide measure of discretion, the exercise of which is subject to limited judicial
review”.101 In Rütgers, a case dealing with a decision of ECHA, it went even further and observed that “it
must be acknowledged that the ECHA has a broad discretion in a sphere which entails political, economic
and social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments”.102Neither
the Advocate General nor the Court referred to these cases in Short-selling and, as a result, it is unclear
whether Rütgers already goes beyond what the Court of Justice held to be permissible in Short-selling.
In any event, the General Court’s jurisprudence stresses the marginal judicial review exercised by the
96See art.1(2) of Décision 22/54 instituant un mécanisme financier permettant la péréquation de la ferraille importée
des pays tiers, JO 4 du 30 mars 1954, p.286.
97Meroni (9/56) [1958] E.C.R. 11 at 153 (emphasis added).
98For the draft in casu, see ESMA, Technical Advice on possible Delegated Acts concerning the regulation on short
selling and certain aspects of credit defaults swaps, ESMA/2012/263, pp.65–67.
99See fn.104.
100 It should further be recalled that the Court in Meroni also noted that the High Authority had to intervene twice
to make a decision because of a disagreement among the board members. The Court thus seemed to suggest that the
existence of such a disagreement must have meant that the criteria laid down by the High Authority were insufficiently
clear. SeeMeroni (9/56) [1958] E.C.R. 11 at 154. In the case of ESMA, it need only be recalled that its competence
may be unlocked by virtue of a disagreement among national regulators.
101Schräder v CPVO (T-187/06) [2008] E.C.R. II-3151 at [59].
102Rütgers Germany GmbH v ECHA (T-96/10) [2013] 3 C.M.L.R. 3 at [134] (emphasis added).
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European Courts when they scrutinise (certain) agencies’ decisions. This, of course, casts some doubt on
the Court of Justice’s conclusion in Short-selling that the exercise of powers by ESMA is “amenable to
judicial review in the light of the legislator’s objectives”.103 Is this really the case if, in a future hypothetical
action, an ESMA decision is challenged and the General Court observes that ESMA enjoys a broad
discretion allowing it to make political, economic and even social choices?
Romano and implementing or delegated acts
When it comes to the adoption of implementing or delegated acts by the Commission, it should be recalled
that agencies such as ESMA have been assigned, under their founding measures, to assist the Commission
in working out drafts of such acts and that these acts further restrict the Commission’s possibility to alter
such drafts because the experts are found at ESMA and not at the Commission.104 This characteristic
potentially undermines the ratio of Meroni,105 but, as noted above, it was not taken up by the Court in its
analysis in Short-selling. To have done so would indeed also have raised the question of institutional
balance, which the Court carefully avoided, as will be seen in the next paragraphs.
Whether Romano added nothing toMeroni, as the Court ruled, is questionable as well. That neither the
Court nor A.G. Warner in Romano referred toMeroni is remarkable in itself, but even more so if Romano
could indeed be completely subsumed underMeroni. In reality, the Court’s objection to the delegation in
Romano rested on two elements. First, under primary law at that time, the Court did not have jurisdiction
to review the acts of the Administrative Commission to which powers had been delegated by the Council.
Secondly, the Court referred to art.155(4) EEC, which provided that the Council could delegate powers
to the Commission. Following the Treaty of Lisbon, the first of these objections has been addressed, but
art.155(4) EEC has been replaced by arts 290 and 291 TFEU.106 Under those provisions, the position of
the Commission has been further strengthened. Under art.155 EEC, the Council was free to decide whether
or not to delegate, but Romano clarified that if the Council decided to delegate, it should delegate to the
Commission. Article 291 TFEU has now objectivised the first decision, taking it out of the hands of the
legislator: if uniform conditions for implementation are required, powers should be vested in the
Commission or, exceptionally, the Council.
The United Kingdom’s second plea on Romano in Short-sellingwas thus inextricably linked to its third
plea on arts 290 and 291 TFEU. This brings us to the question raised above on how the institutional balance
fits in withMeroni and Romano, and whether it indeed underlies both rulings. After all, if the plain wording
of arts 290 and 291 TFEU reserves certain executive powers to the Commission, it cannot be denied that
granting such (similar) powers to agencies affects the Commission’s institutional position and thus the
institutional balance. As was noted above, while A.G. Jääskinen referred to the institutional balance, he
did not develop his reasoning based on that principle. The Court has taken an even bolder step by not even
referring one single time to the institutional balance. In a sense, this is completely in line with the Court’s
previous jurisprudence. Whereas it has qualified the institutional balance as a principle of EU law,107 it
103See Short-selling (C-270/12) January 22, 2014 at [53].
104See fn.98; and Chamon, “EU Agencies between ‘Meroni’ and ‘Romano’ or the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea”
(2011) 48 C.M.L. Rev. 1055, 1068–1070.
105See D. Curtin, Executive Power of the European Union: Law, Practices, and the Living Constitution (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009), pp.173–174.
106See Chamon, “EU Agencies between ‘Meroni’ and ‘Romano’ or the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea” (2011) 48
C.M.L. Rev. 1055, 1066–1068.
107European Parliament v Council of the European Union (Minimum Common Lists) (C-133/06) [2008] E.C.R.
I-3189; [2008] 2 C.M.L.R. 54 at [56]–[57].
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has never actually solved a case based on that principle when invoked by a party before it.108 The Court
has been criticised for being too unreceptive to institutional balance arguments brought before it,109 and
the present case is a perfect illustration of this. The Court again confirmed that the principle of institutional
balance is in fact not an actionable principle of EU law.110 Just as the Romano case was hollowed out by
the Court to the brink of being irrelevant, so the Court has again confirmed the irrelevance of the institutional
balance.
Delegations or conferrals?
The last of the questions raised above dealt with the possible differences that arise from qualifying agency
empowerments as either delegations or conferrals. Whereas, again, the Advocate General made this
distinction, the Court did not. This was of course, in itself, a consequence of the Court’s reinterpretation
ofMeroni, reducing it to the single prohibition of delegating discretionary powers. As noted above, another
element of the original Meroni ruling was the rule that a delegating authority could not delegate more
powers than it itself possesses. If this rule had been retained by the Court, it would have stumbled upon
the problem of ESMA’s powers not being originally vested in the EU legislator, as the Advocate General
had. The Court avoided this issue and thereby left the question open, even if it may now be assumed that
discretionary powers cannot be the object of either delegations or conferrals.
Issues following the Short-selling case
Apart from the open issues related to themain questions dealt with in the preceding section, the Short-selling
case raises further new issues or puts old ones in the spotlight (again). A first point is the Court’s refutation
of arts 290 and 291 TFEU as constituting an exhaustive system of delegated and implementing acts.111
Here, the Court sanctioned a longstanding practice, as, since the 1990s, the legislator has established
agencies that adopt atypical executive acts. For instance, OHIM’s decisions on granting trade marks meet
the definition of implementing acts under art.291 TFEU, since the very purpose of an EU-wide trade mark
is to ensure uniformity in protection on the entire EU market. Yet, trade marks are not granted by the
Commission but by OHIM. While not revolutionary in itself, it should be noted that the Court has now
clearly sanctioned this practice without indicating clear limits for the legislator: in which situations may
the legislator opt for a different system from that laid down in arts 290 and 291 TFEU, of delegated or
implementing instruments? Does the legislator have complete freedom here? The only kind of vague limit
that the Court seems to suggest is the fact that agencies have a “high degree of professional expertise”.112
On this point, Ohler rightly remarks that, following Short-selling, it appears to be easier for the legislator
to delegate powers to an agency than to delegate powers to the Commission.113 As noted elsewhere, the
108 In those cases where the principle played a decisive role, it was invoked by the Court of its own motion; see
European Parliament v Council of Ministers of the European Communities (Chernobyl) (C-70/88) [1990] E.C.R.
I-2041; [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 91; and France v Commission (C-233/02) [2004] E.C.R. I-2759.
109D. Chalmers, “Justifying Institutional Accommodation” (2008) 33 E.L. Rev. 455, 456.
110 In her Opinion in Audiolux, however, A.G. Trstenjak observed that “the Court established, as early as 1958 on
the basis of its judgment inMeroni and subsequently in consistent case-law, the notion of ‘institutional balance’ from
a combination of the organisational principles and powers to act under the Treaties … and accorded it the role of a
normative, actionable formal principle”. See Opinion of A.G. Trstenjak in Audiolux SA v Groupe Bruxelles Lambert
SA (GBL) (C-101/08) [2009] E.C.R. I-9823; [2010] 1 C.M.L.R. 39 at [105] (emphasis added).
111Already during the second wave of agency creation, Triantafyllou pointed to the pertinence of this question. See
D. Triantafyllou, Les compétences d’attribution au domaine de la loi: étude sur les fondements juridiques de l’action
administrative en droit communautaire (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1997), p.306.
112Short-selling (C-270/12) January 22, 2014 at [85].
113Ohler, “Rechtsetzungsbefugnisse der Europäischen Wertpapier- und Marktaufsichtsbehörde (ESMA)” (2014)
69 JZ 244, 251.
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issue here is not so much that the Court has sanctioned the use of atypical acts, since the institutions have
resorted to such acts already for a long time, but that the Court has now ruled that it is perfectly possible
for atypical EU bodies, rather than the institutions, to adopt equally atypical acts.114 This is a potential
Pandora’s box at a time when the coherence of the EU legal order is already under pressure.115
The Court’s ruling, sanctioning a significant shift of powers to the advantage of EU agencies, has further
highlighted the stark contrast between the agencies’ importance in the European Union’s functioning and
their constitutional anchoring in the EU legal order. A result of this is that (democratic) control over these
bodies is underdeveloped, as was also implicitly noted by the Advocate General in his Opinion. Here, two
effects of the empowerment of EU agencies should be noted. First, there is a (theoretical) horizontal shift
in powers, since the legislator grants powers to an EU agency rather than to the authority indicated by the
Treaties (i.e. the Commission). Secondly, there is (usually) a vertical shift in powers, since an EU agency
will be competent whereas, beforehand, (only) national authorities had competence.
The result is that the European Parliament loses influence, since its scrutiny over agencies is not as
comprehensive as that which it exercises over the Commission. Secondly, national parliaments lose
influence since they only scrutinise national authorities, not EU agencies. In addition, it should be noted
that the EU legislator not only increasingly relies on EU agencies, but also increasingly instructs Member
States to create independent agencies in their national legal orders.116 Independent national regulators in
energy, finances, and telecoms are then brought together in an independent EU agency to implement and
set out the European Union’s policies, but who then controls this agencified multilevel administration?
A number of solutions are imaginable here. As Griller and Orator suggested, and as was noted above,
the European Parliament’s powers vis-à-vis EU agencies could be strengthened.117 The authors have also
suggested strengthening the Commission’s control over these agencies.118 This would indeed address two
problems: that of the agencies’ accountability and that of securing the Commission’s prerogatives under
the institutional balance. To this end, Griller and Orator suggested giving the Commission veto rights over
agencies’ decisions. Whether this would be workable is another question, as the information asymmetry
between the Commission and agencies would probably relegate a veto option to a mere theoretical
possibility.119 Enhancing the Commission’s position through, inter alia, its representation on the Board is
another possibility. During the third wave of agency creation, the Commission had indeed proposed to
establish agencies’ boards with parity between Commission and Council representatives, which the Council
consistently rejected. The Commission had also proposed this in its draft inter-institutional agreement,120
but the (non-binding) Common Approach has now firmly buried this idea, without addressing the issue.
However, the Short-selling case clearly requires the legislator to take up this issue again.
114See Chamon, “Le recours à la soft law comme moyen d’éluder les obstacles constitutionnels au développement
des agences de l’UE” (2014) 576 RUE 152, 159.
115On the European Union’s response to the euro crisis, Dawson and De Witte even speak of a “rejection of the
treaties’ normative structure”; seeM. Dawson and F. deWitte, “Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro-Crisis”
(2013) 76 Modern Law Review 817, 818.
116On this point, seeM. Ludwigs, “Die Bundesnetzagentur auf demWeg zur Independent Agency? Europarechtliche
Anstöße und verfassungsrechtliche Grenzen” (2011) 44 Die Verwaltung 41, 44–46 specifically.
117Griller and Orator, “Everything under Control?” (2010) 35 E.L. Rev. 3, 29. It may be noted that during the
Convention on the Future of Europe, the Parliament proposed to allow EU agencies to adopt implementing acts, with
a scrutiny mechanism allowing the two arms of the legislature and the Commission to repeal such acts, see point 17
of Resolution of the European Parliament on the typology of acts and the hierarchy of legislation in the European
Union [2002] OJ C31E/126.
118Griller and Orator, “Everything under Control?” (2010) 35 E.L. Rev. 3, 29.
119See also M. Chamon, “EU Agencies: Does the Meroni Doctrine Make Sense?” (2010) 17 Maastricht J. Eur.
Comp. Law 381, 292.
120Commission, “Interinstitutional Agreement on the operating framework for the European regulatory agencies”
COM(2005) 59 final, p.7.
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The establishment and empowerment of the Single Resolution Board
In a final, shorter, section, the two opinions prepared by the CLS will be looked at in the light of the
Court’s ruling in Short-selling. As Commissioner Barnier has observed, the single supervisorymechanism
(SSM) involving the European Central Bank (ECB) is a cornerstone of the new Banking Union for the
euro zone, the single resolution mechanism (SRM) being its indispensable complement.121 An SRM is
indeed necessary to deal with banks that do fail, despite the (improved) supervision provided through the
SSM. To this end, the Commission proposed the SRM in July 2013.122 The Commission proposes that in
participating Member States (in the Banking Union), the rules laid down in the Bank Recovery and
Resolution Directive (addressed to all EU Member States) should be applied by the Single Resolution
Board (SRB), a new EU agency, as well as by the national resolution authorities and the Commission.
Just like ESMA, the SRB would be established on the basis of art.114 TFEU and would be granted
considerable powers. One of the Council working parties therefore referred two questions to the CLS
querying the suitability of art.114 TFEU as a legal basis for the SRM and about the compatibility of the
SRB’s powers with theMeroni doctrine. In September and October 2013, the CLS delivered its opinions,
which were quickly leaked and found their way to the Financial Times website.123
The Commission’s proposal
Under the Commission’s proposal, the SRB would participate in a resolution as follows. In a first phase,
before a resolution is even at issue, the national authorities would send all relevant information to the
SRB, which would work out a resolution plan for the entities covered by the regulation.124 The plans would
spell out the options available when an entity would be put into resolution, but the SRB could ask the
national authorities to draft these plans for it.125 The regulation would also, inter alia, list a number of
criteria that the SRB must take into account to determine the relevant minimum requirement for own
funds, which the entities covered should maintain.126
In the intervention phase, the relevant supervisory authorities (national authorities or the ECB) will
keep the SRB informed so that the latter may, based on that information, prepare the resolution of an
entity.127 As to the actual resolution, the regulation would list general resolution objectives and principles
that the SRB and the Commission should pursue and respect.128 It would be up to the SRB to assess,
following the criteria defined by the regulation, whether a resolution is indeed required.129 If it comes to
a positive assessment, the SRB would recommend to the Commission that the entity should be placed
under resolution.130 The Commission would then take a decision and decide on the framework for the
resolution at the same time.131Within the limits set by the framework, the SRBwould decide on a resolution
121M. Barnier, “L’union bancaire européenne: condition de la stabilité financière durable et prélude à une nouvelle
étape de l’intégration européenne” (2013) 571 RUE 462.
122See “Proposal for a Regulation establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit
institutions and certain investment firms” COM(2013) 520 final.
123See A. Barker, “Blow to German Banking Union Plan”, Financial Times, September 12, 2013; A. Barker,
“Setback for Brussels as Lawyers warn on Banking Union Plans”, Financial Times, October 8, 2013.
124See Proposal, COM(2013) 520 art.7(1).
125See Proposal, COM(2013) 520 art.7(8).
126See Proposal, COM(2013) 520 art.10.
127See Proposal, COM(2013) 520 art.11(2).
128See Proposal, COM(2013) 520 arts 12 and 13.
129See Proposal, COM(2013) 520 art.16(2).
130See Proposal, COM(2013) 520 art.16(5).
131See Proposal, COM(2013) 520 art.16(6).
Analysis and Reflections 399
(2014) 39 E.L. Rev. June © 2014 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors
scheme, addressed to the national resolution authorities, which would, in turn, be instructed to take the
necessary measures to implement the scheme.132
In the scheme, the SRB would also set out the amounts that would be used from the Fund.133 The
resources of the Fund used in a resolution would be made up of contributions by the entities covered by
the regulation themselves.134 The SRB would own and manage the Fund, and it would be responsible for
monitoring the execution of the scheme, relying in this task on the national authorities.135 Lastly, in order
for the SRB to be able to fulfil its role in the different phases, it would be granted significant information
and investigative powers, and would also be able to fine entities that do not co-operate.136
Article 114 TFEU as a legal basis
In the light of the powers of ESMA under Regulation 236/2012, it is important to note that the SRBwould
receive more intrusive powers. Some of the decisions of the SRB in the first phase, for instance, the
determination of the minimum requirement for own funds, would even have significant effects on all of
the entities concerned, not just those that might (later) be placed under resolution. Under its information
and investigation powers, it would be able to give (binding) instructions to national authorities. The SRB
would also have the power to grant waivers to entities concerned allowing them to be exempt from the
requirement of a resolution plan.137 The SRBwould decide on the resolution scheme (within the framework
set by the Commission) and decide on the resolution tools to be used throughout the resolution. Just like
ESMA, the SRB would be able to step in during a resolution when a national resolution authority is not
adequately enforcing the SRB’s scheme and the SRB would do so by directly addressing decisions to the
entity concerned.138 Since the Fund would be managed by the SRB, the latter would decide on the
contributions payable, possible borrowing by the Fund, and the use of the Fund’s resources in a resolution.
If the same approach as that developed by A.G. Jääskinen were taken, the conclusion should be that
art.114 TFEU cannot be the proper legal basis for empowering the SRB since it would take decisions
under the SRM in substitution of national authorities.139 However, the CLS found no problem with the use
of art.114 TFEU in its opinion, because,
“the centralised decision procedure described in the proposal cannot be regarded as an isolated
regulatory measure with autonomous purposes, but is conceived as an element contributing to an
on-going harmonisation process in the field of financial services, without which its establishment
would have no sense.”140
Drawing an analogy with Smoke Flavourings, the CLS noted that the resolution decisions by the Board
(and Commission) would result in the harmonisation effect aimed at by the resolution rules, which are
also laid down in the proposed directive, just like the single list of authorised products resulted in
harmonisation in Smoke Flavourings.141
The CLS further observed that the proposal is part of a whole body of regulation harmonising the
internal market and that the essential elements of the harmonisation measure, as prescribed by Smoke
132See Proposal, COM(2013) 520 art.16(8).
133See Proposal, COM(2013) 520 arts 16(6) and 71(1).
134See Proposal, COM(2013) 520 arts 66 and 67.
135See Proposal, COM(2013) 520 art.26.
136See Proposal, COM(2013) 520 art.36.
137See Proposal, COM(2013) 520 art.9.
138See Proposal, COM(2013) 520 art.26(2).
139Compare Opinion of A.G. Jääskinen in Short-selling (C-270/12) September 12, 2013 at [56].
140Legal Service of the Council, Examination of the proposed legal basis (September 11, 2013), 13524/13, p.10.
141Legal Service of the Council, Examination of the proposed legal basis (September 11, 2013), 13524/13, p.11.
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Flavourings, were provided in the uniform rules on resolution which “are the necessarymaterial substratum
that serves the proposal’s aim to achieve the highest degree of uniform application, so that disparities in
the internal market are eliminated”.142 The CLS thus emphasised the importance of the SRM in the
harmonisation process related to the resolution of banks, and the importance of the latter in the
harmonisation process related to the Banking Union, to conclude that art.114 TFEU was the appropriate
legal basis for the proposed regulation. The CLS then found that the SRB’s proposed powers would just
be another centralised procedure, as already validated in Smoke Flavourings, without finding it problematic,
unlike A.G. Jääskinen, that an agency would replace national authorities.
The CLS’s opinion thus seems to be very much in line with the Court’s subsequent ruling in the
Short-selling case, where it stresses the contribution to a process of harmonisation. Under the Court’s
reasoning in Short-selling, where it emphasised the two conditions for unlocking art.114 TFEU, it seems
clear that the SRM may be qualified as an approximation measure and that its object is the establishment
and functioning of the internal market (in financial services). The real question is, then, whether the
legislator would not overstep its margin of discretion, also emphasised by the Court in Short-selling, when
its finds that the establishment and empowerment of the SRB are necessary for the purpose of establishing
an SRM in the context of the Banking Union. As noted above, the European Union’s legislative
decision-making would benefit from a serious and detailed scrutiny (and motivation) of the real necessity
of empowering (and establishing) agencies to achieve the envisaged processes of harmonisation.
The SRB andMeroni
In its opinion on the “Delegation of powers to the Board”, the CLS was less convinced of the soundness
of the SRM proposal. Since the core of the SRB’s powers has been set out above they do not need to be
repeated here. In its opinion, the CLS seems to have drawn inspiration from A.G. Jääskinen’s Opinion in
Short-selling, which was delivered one month earlier. For instance, the CLS also rules out the possibility
of an agency supplementing the EU legislative framework, while allowing agencies to adopt implementing
measures subject to theMeroni doctrine.When addressing the scope of the notion “discretionary choices”,
the CLS, just like the Advocate General but unlike the Court, narrows this down, focusing on “policy
choices” reserved to the legislator.143 Conceptually, however, unlike the Advocate General but just like
the Court, the CLS has not made the distinction between the delegation and conferral of powers, unlike
in its opinion on OHIM, noted earlier, and instead using these notions interchangeably.
While not taking issue with the SRB’s proposed powers as such, the CLS has noted that the proposal
is, in certain respects, insufficiently precise as to how the SRB ought to exercise its powers, and would
hence grant it the possibility to set out the European Union’s resolution policy itself rather than that policy
being defined for the SRB. As regards the drafting of the resolution plan, as well as the implementation
of the resolution tools and decisions, the CLS suggests that the Commission could be empowered to set
out further criteria by delegated acts. For other powers exercised by the SRB, the CLS suggests that the
regulation itself could include further specifications or that an EU institution proper (i.e. the Commission
or, exceptionally, the Council) should be involved in the exercise of those powers.
That any analysis of the nature of a power may appear rather subjective can be illustrated by reference
to the CLS’s discussion of the SRB’s powers in the prevention phase of a resolution. According to the
CLS, the criteria imposed on the SRB in art.8(2) of the proposal “are of a rather general nature founded
142Legal Service of the Council, Examination of the proposed legal basis (September 11, 2013), 13524/13, p.12.
143Opinion of A.G. Jääskinen in Short-selling (C-270/12) September 12, 2013 at [93]; and Legal Service of the
Council, Delegation of powers to the Board (October 7, 2013), 14547/13, p.5.
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on undetermined legal concepts that would leave in the hands of the Board the capacity to determine when
the companies are resolvable”.144 To be sure, art.8(2) provides:
“An entity shall be deemed resolvable if it is feasible and credible for the resolution authority to
either liquidate it under normal insolvency proceedings or to resolve it by applying to it the different
resolution tools and powers without giving rise to significant adverse consequences for financial
systems, including circumstances of broader financial instability or systemwide events, of theMember
State in which the entity is situated, or otherMember States, or the Union and with a view to ensuring
the continuity of critical functions carried out by the entity.”
It is difficult to see, however, how this criterion is significantly more general or vague than the criteria
sanctioned by the Court in the Short-selling case. Since the Court did not really set a clear rule in that
case, it is also difficult to assess the proposed powers of the SRB and any analysis necessarily remains on
a case-by-case basis.
In any event, the approach of the CLS would suggest that few powers are discretionary per se (and thus
non-delegable under Meroni) but that everything depends on the context whereby the definition of the
policy should be made by the EU institutions proper. Here, the opinion joins perfectly with the reasoning
of the Court in Short-selling. To the CLS, agencies would thus be allowed to exercise discretion as long
as it is not related to policy. However, just as was noted in relation to the Court’s ruling, the CLS, too,
seems to overlook the General Court’s jurisprudence endorsing the exercise of policy-discretion by
agencies.145
It should further be noted that the relativity of the restrictions of the Meroni doctrine is also apparent
from the CLS’s opinion when it (rightly) notes that “[w]ere the [SRB] simply to address recommendations
to the Commission, the eventual policy choice would rest with the Commission and there could be
incompatibility with the Meroni case-law”.146 According to the CLS, agencies are thus allowed to take
discretionary choices, as long as the final decision is taken by the Commission, regardless of whether the
Commission de facto has any margin left to alter the agencies’ drafts. Here, again, a parallel may be drawn
with the Court’s ruling in Short-selling, since the Court identified the delegated acts adopted by the
Commission as effectively restricting ESMA’s margin of discretion, despite the fact that these acts are
drafted by ESMA itself. IfMeroni was about securing real accountability, the formal restrictions derived
from that ruling by the Court and the CLS would seem to fail in doing so,147 requiring the institutions to
think again about controlling and/or securing accountability of EU agencies.
Conclusion
The Court in Short-selling has delivered an important ruling, sanctioning agencification but without,
however, setting limits to the further development of this process. Unlike the Advocate General, the Court
found art.114 TFEU to be a suitable legal basis to empower ESMA, thereby confirming the legality of
the empowerments of a number of other agencies as well. The Advocate General’s solution, using art.352
TFEU rather than art.114 TFEU, would have put a serious brake on future agencification, since every
Member State would have (re)gained a veto power. For the SRB, for instance, it would have been doubtful
whether art.114 TFEU could have been used. In addition, it would also have diminished the role of the
144Legal Service of the Council, Delegation of powers to the Board (October 7, 2013), 14547/13, p.10.
145See cases cited in fnn.101 and 102.
146Legal Service of the Council, Delegation of Powers to the Board (October 7, 2013), 14547/13, p.7. However, in
early writings, this technique was deemed to be in contravention of Meroni; see e.g. G. Olmi, “L’Agriculture” in G.
van der Meersch, M. Waelbroeck and L. Plouvier (eds), Droit des Communautés européennes (Bruxelles: Larcier,
1969), pp.703–704.
147See also Curtin, Executive Power of the European Union (2009), pp.173–174.
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European Parliament in the legislative process of setting up and empowering agencies. The Court’s ruling
should therefore be supported on this point, even if the European Union’s legitimacy would benefit from
reducing the emphasis on the legislator’s large discretion and emphasising, instead, the legislator’s duty
to elaborate on why powers should, exceptionally, be vested in agencies.
The Advocate General, the Court and the CLS all referred to Romano, but did not deduce further
requirements from that case in addition to those which flow fromMeroni. The Court’s reinterpretation of
the latter case, resulting in a Meroni-light doctrine, also allows the process of agencification to develop
further. The CLS found the SRB proposal to be in breach of Meroni, but whether this is the case under
the Court’s new Meroni-light variant of the doctrine is questionable. Still, since the Court did not take
over the Advocate General’s (and the CLS’s) suggestion to reserve policy decisions to the legislator and
the Commission, and because it emphasised the context in which a power is exercised, any determination
should necessarily be done on a case-by-case basis. The Court’s finding that the exercise by ESMA of its
powers is amenable to judicial review then stands in contrast with the General Court’s emphasis on the
agencies’ far-reaching discretion, raising the question as to whether the Court’s review is indeed an
effective limit.
While the Short-selling case should also be welcomed because it finally confirms the applicability of
Meroni and Romano to EU agencies, the rejection of Romano’s relevance beyond that of Meroni should
be deplored. The logical result of this was that the institutional balance was denied any meaningful role
in the Court’s reasoning. In turn, this has meant that the Commission’s prerogatives under the Treaties
have seemingly been ignored. Following Short-selling, the Commission is no longer the default executive
actor in the EU executive, since the legislator is free further to develop the system of executive acts
(partially) worked out in arts 290 and 291 TFEU.
EU agencies can now be vested with very significant powers, but this only highlights the fact that the
framework governing their functioning is underdeveloped. The proposed inter-institutional agreement
could have addressed some of the problems flowing from this, but the Common Approach is grossly
insufficient in this regard. However, Short-selling should be a reminder to the institutions (or even the
Treaty authors) that their understanding of the EU executive should be updated, taking into account the
European Union’s need to rely on agencies as well as the primary role which the Commission should play
in this sphere.
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